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Abstract. Critical infrastructures are complex networked systems. They
must be able to provide essential services, even when they are compro-
mised by intentional or accidental threats. Guaranteeing essential ser-
vices means to ensure survivability with an adequate Quality of Service
(QoS). This paper proposes a model-driven approach for the assessment
of survivability requirements. In particular, we propose a graphical Sur-
vivability Assessment Model (SAM), based on UML. It is automatically
derived from a UML specification that encompasses essential services,
service modes, threats and survivability strategies. Furthermore, model-
driven techniques are used to assess the SAM. Then, we propose some
preliminary property verifications to discover flaws in the specification.
The model driven paradigm is used to ensure high level of usability and
abstraction of the artifacts that are key issues in communication among
stakeholders. The approach has been applied to a scaled-down model
of a smart grid, an evolution of traditional power grids based on high
performance and dependable computer networks.
Keywords. Security Requirement Elicitation, UML Misuse Case, Service
Survivability, Model Transformations, Networked Systems Security
1. Introduction
The integration of computer networks within complex critical infrastructures in-
troduces new threats and technological issues. They can compromise the infras-
tructure correct functioning and also harm human life. An example of critical in-
frastructure is constituted by smart energy grids. These are computing and com-
munication infrastructures used to gather information about suppliers and con-
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sumers. The aim is for optimizing the energy supply, then improving the overall
efficiency, reliability, and sustainability in an autonomic way. In this context, it
is a crucial need to ensure service survivability; this is the capability of a sys-
tem to provide “essential services” with a specified Quality of Service despite the
occurrence of threats or attacks [6].
Eliciting survivability requirements in such infrastructures can be a hard task.
Consider that the earliest phases of system development are the most critical.
This is because an incomplete and/or inconsistent requirement specification can
bring to vulnerable systems. We consider models as first class citizens in the
assessment of requirements for critical systems. Then, we propose a Survivability
Assessment Model (SAM), that can be formally verified. It will be an important
support for requirement engineers in identifying gaps and/or errors in the system
specification.
In this paper, we then propose an approach to generate a SAM using model-
driven techniques. The approach consists of two steps. First, an improved Mis-
use Case Diagram (MUCD) specification is produced. It considers system essen-
tial services, service modes, threats and mitigation strategies. Second, a state-
based SAM is automatically generated from the MUCD specification, by means
of model-driven techniques. The SAM enables engineers to easily discover flaws
in the system specification.
This work builds on the results presented in [3], where a Petri Net model
was generated from the SAM to verify survivability properties through model
checking. The original contribution of this paper is to support the verification of
such properties directly on the SAM by means of model queries without generating
state-based models that scale hard with the dimension of the system.
The proposed approach is applied for the survivability assessment of a scaled-
down model of a smart grid.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 introduces the Smart
Grid case study. Section 3 overviews the proposed approach. Section 4 describes
the system specification process and applies it to the Smart Grid case study.
Section 5 focuses on the verification process of SAM survivability properties.
Section 6 provides a review of the related literature. Finally, Section 7 provides
closing remarks.
2. The Smart Micro Grid case study
Traditional power grids rely on dated architecture where the generation is cen-
tralized — mostly based on non-renewable sources. Moreover, the energy is de-
livered to passive consumers through the transmission and distribution lines [14].
Very often they are affected by blackout events, especially during peak energy
periods (e.g., [9]), cascading failures (e.g., [12]), energy lacks and thefts along the
distribution line. On the other hand, they are also a sensitive target for terrorist
attacks (e.g., [1]). Such limitations clearly show that traditional power grids are
not able to cope with a higher energy demand, higher security and reliability,
lower environmental impacts and reduced operating costs.
To face such issues, several governments and energy agencies are promoting
a radical change in electrical distribution on the grid to close energy consumers
and consumers. Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) encompass new assets like,
e.g, renewable sources such as wind, hydro and/or Solar power. In particular,
Distributed Generators or Energy Storages (EGs) that absorb energy peaks and
avoid lacks of energy. Finally, the demand-response management policy enables
to define a set of modifications in final customers electricity usage, in response
to changes in the price of energy or to reduce the energy consumption when the
system reliability is compromised [26]. DERs enable customers to take energy
from the distribution grid but also to generate energy themselves to satisfy their
needs and, possibly, to sell the surplus of energy back to the distribution operator.
The management of such new power grids requires an advanced Information
and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure that is able to provide mon-
itoring and measurement functionalities; the effects are to detect incorrect be-
haviors and failures, to enhance a QoS-aware consumption and to provide billing
and accounting functionalities [7, 19]. Security is also a primary issue but it has
been traditionally coped by experimental approaches — e.g., PMUs [5], other
monitoring technologies [20], big data analysis [30].
The DER approach, currently addressed by several European governments,
consists in clustering the whole distribution grid in smaller areas, namely Smart
Micro Grids [17]. Figure 1 shows a typical architecture, which has been defined
considering the requirements collected from surveys [28] and [2]. Electricity con-
Figure 1. Smart Micro Grid Architecture
sumers (e.g., private houses, public or commercial enterprises) are connected to
the distribution lines. Some, or even all, of them own a local power generator
to satisfy the local demand. Moreover, they are equipped with a smart meter, a
device that periodically records the consumption of energy and transmits data
to the distribution system operator for metering and billing purposes. Along the
distribution lines EGs gather all the energy that has been locally generated but
not consumed. Smart Micro Grids provide several advantages for both customer
and distribution operator. Customers can (i) receive invoices on real consump-
tion, (ii) issue tailored tariffs, and (iii) obtain savings in billing. Operators can (i)
obtain peak shaving, (ii) realize energy efficiency and CO2 reduction, (iii) reduce
commercial and technical losses.
In a more futuristic vision, the appliances connected to the grid will get
smarter. For example, to perform more efficient and productive use of electricity
(e.g.,reducing power consumption during peak hours and operating during those
hours when power costs less). Also they will have two-way communication links,
allowing commands to be sent toward the smart appliances for multiple purposes
as for example the remote service disconnections.
3. Approach overview
The approach focuses on the survivability assessment of the system. In partic-
ular, the aim is to produce an improved system requirement specification and
to leverage it for verifying system survivability properties. Figure 2 provides an
overview of the approach by highlighting the main tasks and produced artifacts
— specifications or models — which are described in the following.
Figure 2. Approach overview.
1. Essential Services and Service Modes specification. During the require-
ments elicitation stage, the engineer identifies the system essential services,
i.e., services that must operate even when affected by faults or attacks.
Also the engineer identifies QoS metrics related to services, which lead to
the definition of the system service modes.
2. Severity assessment. This activity is aimed to grade the service modes
by their severity. We conform to the severity concept adopted by Syman-
tec [24] where higher is the severity, higher the damage in case the service
mode is entered.
3. Survivability strategies specification. During the requirements elicitation,
potential threats to the system and related countermeasures — i.e., resis-
tance, recognition and recovery strategies [6] — need to be identified.
4. Misuse case specification. Using the the Misuse Case UML profile [22] the
specifications produced in the previous steps are used to generate a misuse
case specification (MUCD) using a text-to-model (T2M) transformation.
5. Survivability Assessment Model. The misuse case specification is used to
generate, by means of a model-to-model (M2M) transformation, the sur-
vivability assessment model (SAM). The SAM is a UML state machine
model.
6. Survivability Properties Verification. This activity is aimed to verify some
predefined system survivability properties by submitting specific queries
on the SAM. The results of this activity provide a feedback to the engineer,
enabling him/her to discover non correct and non complete points in the
misuse case specification — such as attacks that have not been addressed
by a proper recovery.
4. Requirements specification
This section describes the requirements elicitation process that enables to produce
the misuse case specification (MUCD) of the system. The Smart Micro Grid,
introduced in Section 2, is used as running example.
4.1. Essential Services and Service Modes specification
An initial task consists in identifying the system service modes, that are defined
in terms of the Quality of Service (QoS) of the essential services. This phase pro-
duces a table (Table 1) that specifies the service modes of a Smart Micro Grid
ICT infrastructure. Among the services offered by the system, the engineer —
possibly with the help of domain experts — selects those that need to survive
despite faults or attacks. For our case study, four essential services are identi-
fied [28]. Two of these services concern the exchange of information between a
smart meter and a distribution system operator: they are the request of energy
prices (Ask Energy Prices) and the transmission of customer’s account and bal-
ance information (Report Account and Balance). The other two services are pro-
vided by the distribution operator: they are related to the estimation of the cur-
rent state of the grid (Estimate State) and the management of energy production
and consumption (Demand Response).
The QoS of an essential service is defined by assigning acceptable threshold
values to a subset of metrics of interest. For example, three metrics have been
defined for the case study: the steady state availability (ssAvail), the confidential-
ity level (confLevel) and the integrity level (integLevel). Table 1 — row labelled
FF — specifies the Full Functionality system service mode that represents the
best QoS offered by the system [21, 25] for the identified essential services. Ob-
serve that essential services can be characterised by different threshold values and
all the metrics values express required minimum thresholds. The other rows of
the table, i.e., Degraded Integrity (DI), Degraded Confidentiality (DC), Degraded
Availability (DA) and Maximum Degradation (MD), specify different system ser-
vice modes considering possible — although still acceptable — degraded values
of (a subset of) the QoS metrics.
Severity assessment Once the system service modes have been defined, they
are ranked. The rank considers the relevance of the degraded QoS metrics and
their minimum threshold values. Therefore, we can provide different priorities for
intervention, just in case the system is threatened by attacks. In the case study, the
steady state availability is considered the QoS metric of major importance followed
by the confidentiality level. The integrity level is instead the QoS metric with
minor relevance. Table 1 — second column — shows the severity level associated to
each degraded service mode of the case study, where the lowest level corresponds
to the highest degradation in compliance with Symantec [24]. In particular, the
DI service mode corresponds to a minor degradation. This is because only the
integrity level, i.e., the QoS metric with minor relevance, has a threshold value
that is degraded with respect to the one in the fully operational service mode (i.e.,
FF). The DC service mode has lower severity level (i.e., L3) than the previous
mode since the confidentiality level, i.e., the QoS metric of medium relevance, is
degraded. The DA service mode is characterised by the degradation of the steady
state availability, that is the QoS metric of major relevance, then it is more severe
than the DC mode. Finally the MD service mode has the lowest severity level,
since the steady state availability is even more degraded.
Essential services
Severity QoS Ask Energy Report Account Estimate Demand
level metric Prices and Balance State Response
F
F -
ssAvail - - (99.99%,min) (99.99%,min)
confLevel (medium,min) (medium,min) (high,min) -
integLevel - (medium,min) (high,min) (high,min)
D
I L4
ssAvail - - (99.99%,min) (99.99%,min)
confLevel (medium,min) (medium,min) (high,min) -
integLevel - (low,min) (medium,min) (medium,min)
D
C L3
ssAvail - - (99.99%,min) (99.99%,min)
confLevel (low,min) (low,min) (medium,min) -
integLevel - (low,min) (medium,min) (medium,min)
D
A L2
ssAvail - - (99.9%,min) (99.9%,min)
confLevel (low,min) (low,min) (medium,min) -
integLevel - (low,min) (medium,min) (medium,min)
M
D L1
ssAvail - - (99.0%,min) (99.0%,min)
confLevel (low,min) (low,min) (medium,min) -
integLevel - (low,min) (medium,min) (medium,min)
Table 1. Specification of severity levels and QoS metric values for each service mode.
4.2. Survivability strategies specification
According to [6], once we have identified the essential services we need to carry
out two tasks: an intrusion analysis based on the system environment; and a sur-
vivability analysis to identify key countermeasures that may include resistance,
recognition and recovery strategies [6].
Intrusion analysis identifies threats to essential services. This is a process car-
ried out by an expert, basically for each threat he/she analyses the consequences for
the system in terms of the degradation that occurs. We summarise the intrusion
analysis through a table (e.g., Table 2).
Survivability analysis is a process carried out by a domain expert, who iden-
tifies for each threat countermeasures of resistance, recognition or recovery. We
summarise the survivability analysis through a table (Table 3).
In the following, we report the intrusion and survivability analyses for the case
study. An ICT infrastructure of a Smart Micro Grid can be threaten by attacks
against: a) the availability, to disrupt the energy delivery; b) the confidentiality,
to stole information from customers and/or the distributor operator; and c) the
integrity, to introduce fake commands that can compromise the grid. In particular,
we identified the following threats (see Table 2):
• Data Injection is an attack to disrupt integrity, and it mostly threats the
Report Account and Balance, Estimate State and Demand Response es-
sential services.
• Spoofing threats confidentiality through the Report Account and Balance
and Estimate State services.
• Eavesdropping threats confidentiality of the Smart Grid, essentially through
the Ask Energy Prices service.
• Flooding threats availability of the Grid by sending a large number of pack-
ets. The services exposed are Estimate State and Demand Response.
• Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) is a disturbance of the communication
channel that can degrade or totally disrupt the service. The source can be
a specific device (malicious attack) or a natural phenomena (accidental
threats). The Demand Response is the target service.
Threats
Essential services Data Injection Spoofing Eavesdropping Flooding EMI
Ask Energy Prices DC
Report Acc. & Bal. DI DC
Estimate State DI DC DA
Demand Response DI DA MD
DI: Degraded Integrity; DC: Degraded Confidentiality;
DA: Degraded Availability; MD: Max. Degradation
Table 2. Summary of the Smart Grid intrusion analysis.
Concerning the survivability analysis, we relied on the work of Wang and
Lu [27] that identifies several countermeasures. We classified them according to
the survivability strategy terminology — introduced by [6] — as follows:
• Resistance is the capability to repel attacks and allows the system to remain
in full functionality [6]. The analysis devises Encryption (RES1) and Point-
to-Point Authentication (RES2). The former mitigates the threats against
confidentiality and the latter those against integrity.
• Recognition is the capability to detect attacks as they occur and to evaluate
the extent of damage and compromise [6]. The analysis devises: Signal-based
detection (DET1) for EMI; Packet-based detection (DET2) for flooding;
and Anomaly-based network detection (DET3) for Data Injection, Spoofing
and Eavesdropping.
• Recovery is the capability to maintain essential services during attack, limit
the extent of damage, and restore services following attack [6]. The analysis
devises: a) Rate-limiting (REC1) to mitigate threats again system availabil-
ity; b) Spread Spectrum protocols (REC2) to mitigate effects due to physical
attacks as EMI; and c) Reconfiguration (REC3) to change network topology
and reduce the effect of flooding attacks.
Strategies
Threats RES2 DET3 RES1 DET2 REC1 DET1 REC2 REC3
Data Injection resistance recognition
Spoofing recognition resistance
Eavesdropping recognition resistance
recognition recovery
Flooding target=FF
recognition recovery recovery
EMI target=DA target=FF
Table 3. Summary of the Smart Grid survivability analysis.
4.3. Misuse case specification
The table-based specification created so far is used to produce an improved mis-
use case diagram (MUCD). Use cases [10] are a well-known technique for elicit-
ing requirements and likely the most popular. Although they are a suitable tech-
nique to capture functional requirements, they are not likewise suited for eliciting
non-functional ones, in particular safety and security requirements. To address
this lack, misuse cases were proposed [23] where use case diagrams are extended
to encompass the misuse of the system by a hostile actor. Herein, MUCD have
been enhanced by adding new extensions (see Table 4 — bold part) in order to
use them for the specification of the survivability requirements. The misuse case
Stereotype Description Tags Extended UML metaclass
misuse A threat scenario targetServiceMode
(name,severityLevel)
Use case
threatens A threat to a service Dependency
mitigates A threat mitigation Dependency
resistance A resistance strategy Use case
recognition A recognition strategy Use case
recovery A recovery strategy targetServiceMode
(name)
Use case
Table 4. Misuse case extensions used in the approach.
extensions have been implemented via UML profiling, which is a lightweight ap-
proach to extend the UML meta-modeling elements, e.g., the use cases. The meta-
modeling approach enables the interoperability between CASE tools (i.e., exchange
of MUCD), whereas the table-based specification does not. Moreover, it supports
M2M transformations, as the one we propose in Section 5 for survivability as-
sessment. In the following, we describe informally the T2M transformation that,
provided in input the table-based specification, produces the MUCD of the Smart
Micro Grid case study (see Figure 3). The transformation includes the following
steps:
1. Each essential service of the Intrusion analysis table (row names of Ta-
ble 2) is transformed into a use case (left-hand side of Figure 3).
2. Each threat of the Intrusion analysis table (column names of Table 2) is
mapped to a misuse case (right-hand side of Figure 3). Moreover:
• Each misuse case has a tag – i.e., targetServiceMode – that indicates
the service mode reached as a consequence of the threat. The tagged-value
is derived from the table entries corresponding to the mapped threat.
• A threatens dependency is created between a misuse case and a use case
when the table entry corresponding to the mapped threat and essential
service is not empty (central part of Figure 3).
3. Each strategy of the survivability analysis table (Table 3) is mapped to a
new use case that is stereotyped according to the table entries corresponding
to the mapped strategy (central part of Figure 3). Moreover:
• Each recovery use case has a tag – i.e., targetServiceMode – indicat-
ing the service mode reached as a result of the strategy. The tagged-value
is derived from the table entries corresponding to the mapped strategy.
• A mitigates dependency is created between a resistance (or recog-
nition) use case and the misuse case it mitigates when the table entry
corresponding to the mapped strategy and threat is not empty.
Finally, the engineer needs to take the following decisions/actions to complete the
misuse case diagram:
1. Identify, in the problem domain, the actors of the use cases and the hostile
actors of the misuse cases. In our case study, the actors are: the Smart
Meter, the Distributor Operator, the Energy Storage. The hostile actor is
the Attacker.
2. Reorganize use cases that represent essential services, using inheritance or
inclusion if it is convenient (see Figure 3 in our case).
3. For each recovery use case, indicate the recognition use case it extends.
The rational is that a recovery process is launched due to a previous threat
recognition. For example, see in Figure 3, the recovery strategies Recon-
figure and SpreadSpectrumProtocols extend the recognition strategy Sig-
nalBasedDetection.
4. Specify both, use cases and misuse cases, using for example the Cockburn
template [4].
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Figure 3. Misuse case diagram of the Smart Micro Grid.
5. Survivability assessment
5.1. Survivability Assessment Model
This section describes the model-driven process that enables to automatically ob-
tain the Survivability Assessment Model (SAM). The SAM is a UML state ma-
chine where the states represent the system service modes specified in Subsec-
tion 4.1 (see Table 1). Transitions, instead, represent changes of service modes
that are triggered by either succeeding attacks or the execution of survivability
strategies. The SAM is obtained from the misuse case diagram through a M2M
transformation, which has been implemented using the ATL language [13]. The
mapping rules of the transformation are described in the following:
• The main rule generates the UML state machine that contains a Full Func-
tionality ( FF) state, which is stereotyped serviceMode. Indeed, we assume
that every system has always an optimal service mode.
• For each misuse case of the MUCD, a new serviceMode state is generated
— if not already created — considering the degraded service mode associ-
ated to the misuse case (targetServiceMode tagged-value). The state is
tagged with its corresponding severity level. For the transition generation,
two different cases are considered:
∗ If the misuse case is mitigated by a resistance use case, a choice node
and three transitions are generated: 1) a transition from the full state
and to the choice node, 2) a transition from the choice node back to the
full state, which models the succeeding of the resistance strategy, and 3)
a transition from the choice node to the degraded state, which models the
failure of the resistance.
∗ Otherwise, a single transition from the full state to the degraded state is
generated.
• For each generated service mode X, each misuse case is again considered
and a transition is created from X to the degraded service mode Y, indicated
by the targedServiceMode tagged-value associated to the misuse case, only
if the severity level of Y is less than the one of X.
• Finally, for each recovery use case a new transition is added from the
degraded service mode — indicated by the tagged-value of the misuse case
mitigated by the strategy — to the service mode specified by the target-
ServiceMode tagged-value of the use case.
Figure 4 shows the SAM obtained by the M2M transformation from the MUCD
in Figure 3.
5.2. Survivability Properties Verification
The assessment of the MUCD can be performed by verifying survivability proper-
ties and providing proper feedback to the engineer about eventual flaws in the sys-
tem specification. To this aim we use the SAM, obtained via M2M transformation
from the MUCD, as input model together with a set of queries that express the
Choice
Choice
Choice
Choice
Choice
MaximumDegradation
DegradedAvailabilityDegradedConfidentialityDegradedIntegrity
<<serviceMode>>
FullFunctionality
<<serviceMode>> <<serviceMode>> <<serviceMode>>
<<serviceMode>>
SpreadSpectrum
Eavesdropping
Spoofing
RateLimiting
Reconfigure
EMI
EMI
Flooding
Spoofing
EMI
Flooding
EavesDropping
DataInjection
Figure 4. Survivability Assessment Model (SAM)
properties to be verified. Herein, queries are defined by exploiting the mechanisms
provided by the ATL language, already used for the M2M transformation.
Considering that the SAM represents the system service modes and the change
of service modes due to threats and survivability strategies, it may be interesting
to check the following survivability properties:
• P1 Whenever the threat T occurs, then the survivability strategy S aimed
to mitigate T will be executed.
• P2 It is always possible to recover the system from a degraded state.
• P3 It is always possible to reach the fully operational state from any de-
graded state.
The verification of P1 is quite straightforward since, for each threat T the
query has to check if there is an outgoing transition, from the service mode associ-
ated to T, that represents the considered survivability strategy S. A more interest-
ing case is represented by the property P2. In this second case, there is the need
to prove that, from each degraded state in the SAM, there is always an outgoing
transition which has as target state either the full functionality or a less severe
service mode. The ATL query that allows to verify P2 is showed in Listing 1. In
order to perform the query, several helpers have been defined that are not reported
for sake of space.
Listing 1: ATL query for P2 verification.
query r e c o v e r a b i l i t y =
UML! S t a t e . a l l I n s t a n c e s ( )−> i t e r a t e ( s t ; s t a t e : UML! S t a t e =
th i sModu le . g e t F u l l F u n c t i o n a l i t y ( ) |
UML! T r a n s i t i o n . a l l I n s t a n c e s ( )
−> s e l e c t ( t r | t r . source = s t and t r . source <> t h i sModu le .
g e t F u l l F u n c t i o n a l i t y ( ) and th i sM odu l e . getStateFromName ( t r .
t a r g e t . name) . oc l I sTypeOf (UML! S t a t e ) )
−> s e l e c t ( t r a | t h i sModu le . ge tSever i tyFromDegraded ( t r a . t a r g e t )>
t h i sModu le . ge tSever i tyFromDegraded ( s t ) ) . debug ( )
) ;
The execution of the query reported in Listing 2, shows that not all the de-
graded states have at least one outgoing transition directed either to a less se-
vere service mode or to the full functionality state. In particular, such states are
the degraded confidentiality state, associated to the Spoofing and Eavesdropping
threats, and the degraded integrity state, associated to the DataInjection threat.
This feedback is useful since the requirement engineer can correct the specification,
introducing proper missing mitigation strategies.
Listing 2: Result of ATL Query for P2 verification
F u l l F u n c t i o n a l i t y : Sequence {}
D e g r a d e d I n t e g r i t y : Sequence {}
D e g r a d e d C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y : Sequence {}
MaximumDegradation : Sequence {T RecoverySpreadSpectrum ,
T RecoveryReconf igure }
D e g r a d e d A v a i l a b i l i t y : Sequence { T RecoveryRateLimit ing }
The P3 property is an example of property that is not possible to verify using the
mechanism of the ATL queries. P3 can be easily expressed with temporal logics
and, therefore, by translating the property verification problem to a model checking
problem. The translation to a model checking problem allows the verification of
complex properties and it is currently one of the most relevant future works we
are addressing.
6. Related work
The survivability assessment of critical infrastructures is a relevant research trend
that, from literature review, appears to be desirable at early stages of system de-
velopment. Laplante [16] suggests to adopt formal methods for the verification of
the specification of critical systems, and reducing as much as possible ambiguities.
In this context, a valuable contribution is in the work by Yue et al. [29] where
an approach to generate a finite state machine from user requirements is provided.
The state machine, expressed in an ad-hoc language, is derived from a modified
version of a misuse case diagram. Nevertheless, work addresses exclusively sys-
tems functional requirements while we are interested also in non-functional ones.
Gomes et al. [8] propose on a model-driven approach that allows deriving a system
state machine from use case diagrams. The purpose of the approach is, in this
case, to generate executable code of the system rather than the verification of the
system specifications.
Jamhour and Penna proposed a study of the restoration (i.e., recovery)
schemes for optical networks based on Continuous Time Markov Chains (CTMCs) [11].
Trivedi et al. deal with the modeling of non functional properties [18]: in this
paper, vulnerabilities of an intrusion-tolerant system are evaluated considering
both the attacker behavior and system response. In such a work, a state-transition
model is proposed that takes into account each behavior of the system under attack.
Starting from the full-working state of the system, the authors consider consider
each phase of the attack (error detection, assessment of damage, recovery and
the treatment of the attack) and produce a finite-state machine representing global
levels of service of the system. The approach of Knight et al. [15] addresses the
survivability of critical systems: in this work, the main difference between a reliable
and a survivable system is that the former has to guarantee the same level of
service, whereas the latter has to guarantee the essential services when failures
happen. For these reasons the concept of graceful degradation is introduced. The
running example of the paper, in fact, shows a state machine describing a set of
systems service modes and possible transition between them.
7. Conclusion
Security is a primary issue in the design of modern high interconnected critical
infrastructures. In this paper, model-driven techniques have been proposed to au-
tomatically obtain a survivability assessment, which that can be used for perform-
ing formal verification as well as in peer-review with system stakeholders. The
approach exploits model transformations for the generation of the SAM from the
MUCD. In particular, the model-to-model transformation is able to infer from
the MUCD single-event chains triggering the transitions from one service mode
to another. In addition, model queries are used to verify some simple properties
on the generated SAM with the aim of providing feedback to the engineer about
missing survivability strategies.
As shown in the paper, the transitions in the survivability assessment model
represent exclusively single attacks or single repair actions. This can constitute a
limitation of the approach that we plan to overcome in future works. Nevertheless,
the approach constitutes a first step in the generation of a complete SAM from the
UML models. Future work will extend the results of this paper in order to provide
support for performing a more fine grained analysis: in particular, quantitative
evaluation of the likelihood of attacks success will be investigated.
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